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This project analyzes existing basketball player performance metrics, and generates new metrics 
providing context behind player statistics. Using these metrics, we create a chart quantifying the 
value of each pick in the NBA Draft. Finally, we create machine learning models that predict the 
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Executive Summary  
This project’s goals are threefold. First, we analyze existing basketball player performance 
metrics, and use these insights to create new metrics that provide a better comparison for players 
in the same season. Secondly, we generate a chart that quantifies the value of each pick in the 
NBA Draft. Finally, we create machine learning models which predict if NCAA Division I 
student-athletes will accomplish various levels of success in the NBA. 
  
We used Player Efficiency Rating, Value Over Replacement Player, Win Shares and Fantasy 
Points as our four established metrics. These metrics represent a spectrum of mechanisms that 
front-offices, coaches, and fans use to evaluate and compare players. Often, these metrics tell 
different stories about the talent of a player, and can be skewed by injury, players who take a 
bench role later in their careers, or purely by nature of playing on a bad team. By examining the 
factors that normalized these metrics, we constructed three additional player performance 
metrics, with the goal of providing better insight into a comparison between two players in the 
same season. These metrics were Cumulative Individual Accolades, Basic Percentile and 
Advanced Percentile. 
  
Using these metrics, we grouped players based on their selection in the NBA Draft, and created 
visualizations showing the different ‘talent curves’. By clustering groups of picks together, we 
created equations which smoothly estimated the value of each pick. We then collated draft pick 
only trades made in the NBA since 2005 and settled on a best curve which accurately mapped 
them. From this, we compared our talent curve for the NBA to both NBA and NFL models, 
where these charts are actively used by teams for guidance in draft-pick trades. 
  
Finally, we used machine learning to construct linear regression models that classify NCAA DI 
players based on various success criteria for the NBA. The success criteria we were particularly 
interested in were being drafted by an NBA team, drafted in the lottery / first round, and playing 
in an NBA game. These models considered not only the basic and advanced statistics of the 
players, but also the school they went to, height and weight. These models were extremely good 
at identifying talented prospects, and many misclassified players were found to have extenuating 
circumstances. 
  
Overall, this project provides significant value to the front offices of NBA teams who are 
attempting to maneuver around the uncertainty associated with the NBA Draft. Selecting the 
right player is extremely important for a team’s long-term success, even with lower picks in the 
draft. By understanding the true value of the team’s draft position, and utilizing models such as 
our own, teams can make more informed draft decisions and extract the maximum value from 






Basketball is exploding both domestically and abroad, with the most recent National Basketball 
Association (NBA) season posting record attendance, TV and online viewership numbers 
(Adgate, 2018). Players now come from 42 countries, with all 30 franchises having at least one 
non-American player. The league is expanding their outreach into emerging markets such as 
China, India and Africa, with 300 million people in China playing basketball (Saiidi, 2018). This 
explosive growth has skyrocketed median team valuations, from $555 million in 2014 to over 
$1.5bn in 2018 (Routley, 2019). 
  
As the NBA has grown, so has the potential lucrativeness of constructing a championship-
winning roster. The Golden State Warriors, winners of three of the last four NBA 
Championships, find themselves paying $90 million in ‘luxury tax’, an economic penalty on 
teams which exceed the salary cap (Ramey, 2018). If they maintain their current roster, they will 
pay $221 million in luxury taxes during the 2020-21 season, more than the actual payroll of $178 
million. The Warriors show just how valuable winning in the NBA is, even when paying such 
high taxes. 
 
With this increased pressure to succeed (and therefore profit), teams must utilize every resource 
at their disposal to ensure they are accurately evaluating players both at the professional and 
collegiate level, the latter of which is the primary supplier of young NBA talent. The NBA Draft 
is held at the end of every season, where each team is awarded two selections in the sixty-pick 
event. Picks 15-60 are assigned in reverse order of record (where the best record team gets the 
30th and 60th picks), and a lottery decides the recipients of the first fourteen picks, with 
probabilities proportional to standings. Teams are free to trade their rights to a draft pick prior, 
during, and after the draft lottery, as they try to maneuver up the draft board to obtain the best 
young talents. 
  
Some teams looking to contend for championships may trade all their draft picks away for 
veteran contributors, as the Brooklyn Nets did in 2014. They traded three first round picks, as 
well as the right to swap first round picks (in four consecutive years), to the Boston Celtics for 
Kevin Garnett, Paul Pierce, and Jason Terry – three championship winning players who declined 
rapidly following Brooklyn’s acquisition (Greenberg, 2017). The Celtics benefitted even more 
from the players’ declines, as the struggling Brooklyn ended up receiving the third, first, and 
eighth selections in the draft- only the rights to the picks belonged to the Celtics. 
 
This project’s goals are threefold. First, we analyze existing basketball player performance 
metrics, and use these insights to create new metrics that provide a better comparison for players 
in the same season. Secondly, we generate a chart that quantifies the value of each pick in the 
NBA Draft. Finally, we create machine learning models that predict if NCAA Division I student-
athletes will be drafted or play in the NBA. 
  
This project is timely, relevant, and important to NBA teams which seek to improve their teams 
through the draft, or trades. By analyzing player performance metrics, teams can contextualize 
the numbers they often are presented with by their analytics departments when debating a 
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prospective trade. Additionally, analytics professionals can supplement the metrics they currently 
use with the ones we created, to generate more informed insights. When proposing or 
deliberating on trades involving draft picks, teams can use our draft pick value chart to ensure 
they are fairly compensated for the outgoing picks. Finally, front offices can verify their scouts’ 
opinions on a collegiate player using the machine learning models we created to ensure they are 
selecting players who will be successful in the NBA.  
 
In the remainder of this report, we first break down existing player performance metrics to better 
understand the mechanisms used by NBA teams when performing trades and contract 
negotiations. Using this understanding, we design three new player performance metrics that 
provide a new approach to evaluating talent. By summating the metric values for a set of NBA 
players, we then generate charts which approximate the relative value of each selection in the 
NBA Draft. Using draft-pick only trades, we calculate the error of each relative value curve to 
finally settle on one equation which explains the value of NBA draft picks. From our literature 
review, we compare our value chart to other NBA charts, as well as numerous NFL value charts, 
to compare the talent drop-off. Finally, using machine learning, we create models that predict if 
NCAA DI basketball players will be drafted and/or play in the NBA. The models use statistical 







2. Background  
2.1 Existing Metrics in the NBA 
Although many casual sports fans attribute the numbers revolution in sport to Moneyball, 
statistics and data were driving decision making in sport from as early as the 1920’s, with 
baseball initially pioneering the movement (Schwarz, 2004). Baseball is largely viewed as the 
easiest game to quantify, as models can describe progress to scoring a run objectively with 
players moving along the bases. Additionally, each pitch is an independent event, further 
allowing itself to be analyzed using basic mathematics.  
 
Basketball, on the other hand, is a free flowing, five on five game where missing an open layup 
after a well-run play counts for the same on the score sheet as a highly contested long-range shot. 
The complexity of basketball makes it a lot tougher to generate numbers which accurately reflect 
the talent level of a player or team. Additionally, Dean Oliver posits, the lack of statistics readily 
counted about defense makes basketball analytics largely skewed towards offensively-minded 
players (Oliver, 2004). Oliver invented the ‘Four Factors’ most critical to team success in 
basketball, namely shooting, rebounding, turnovers, and free throws. Each of the Four Factors 
are weighted differently and measured using 
advanced metrics. His book introducing these 
metrics, Basketball on Paper, is widely regarded as 
the bible of basketball analytics. 
 
Fast forward 15 years from the book’s publication 
date, and data has truly revolutionized basketball. 
Teams have discovered the value of the three-point 
shot, and offenses and teams are now constructed 
to find threes and layups (Shot Search, n.d.). It’s no 
coincidence that the teams investing the most in 
analytics, such as the Houston Rockets, are finding 
the most success. Figure 1 shows the large 
disparity in shot selection between the Rockets and 
the New York Knicks – a team languishing at the 
bottom of the NBA standings. 
 
An analysis of basketball metrics is not something 
novel, but past papers arbitrarily pick statistics to 
incorporate into their analysis (Mertz, et al., 2016). 
For example, including points, rebounds and assists 
in addition to Win Shares per 48 minutes double 
counts the basic points, rebounds and assists 
statistic. Any ranking of players will require 
careful consideration of the basic statistics that go 
into the metrics used, as well as any possible 
normalizing factors used, such as minutes played, team wins, or pace of play.   
 





2.2 Assessing Draft Value in Sports 
2.2.1 NFL 
One of the project’s goals is identifying the value of draft picks in the NBA. In the NFL, there 
exists a widely known draft value table constructed by former Dallas Cowboys head coach 
Jimmy Johnson (Johnson, 2019). This draft table was designed to assess what a fair trade would 
be when trading draft picks. The work done by Barney et. al showcased that draft pick trades did 
in fact follow closely the values assigned in this draft value table. Indicating either the teams 
used the draft table  to decide if the trade was fair  or the table accurately showcases relative 
value for draft picks.  In either case the most important aspect in determining if a draft table is 
effective is if trades that are made reflect relative values given in the table.  Figure 2 displays the 
first 60 picks and their value from the Jimmy Johnson draft table. 
 
 





However, unlike the NFL, the NBA does not have a publicly known draft value table. NBA draft 
value tables do exist, one of which was created by ESPN staff writer Kevin Pelton. In Pelton’s 
first draft value table, he confines the value of a pick to only the years played on the rookie 
contract since unless that player is traded they will be providing value to the team they were 
selected on (Pelton, Making smart, valuable trades to move up in the draft is harder than it looks, 
2015). Pelton acknowledged that in doing so he decreases the value of a top pick because the 
value they provide after the rookie contract is also likely more than lower picks. He remade his 
draft value chart with the addition of looking at how players drafted between 2003-07 performed 
in years 5-9 of their careers (Pelton, Trade down or keep No. 1 pick: Which is more valuable?, 
2017). This time frame was considered because this would be the amount of time covered by a 
maximum rookie extension. Figure 3 displays Kevin Pelton’s 2017 draft value table. 
 
 





When comparing the two draft tables side by side, the values are similar. With the 7th pick 
having the same relative value in each and the 15th pick having a percent difference of 12% in 
relative value. The major difference between the two tables comes after these first 15 selections 
as we transition into the latter half of the first round and into the second round for the NBA. 
NBA players relative value drops below 10% of the first pick’s value at the 31st pick which is 
the first pick of the second round. Contrast that with the first pick in the second round of the NFL 
(33) which has a relative value of 19.33% of the first pick. These two picks have a percent 
difference of 73% which is quite substantial. This large difference suggests that the drop off for 
relative value in a pick decreases faster and steeper in basketball than they do in football.  
 
A main reason for the large difference is there being less people on a team and playing at one 
time in basketball than in football. In basketball there are more opportunities for a player to make 
an impact when playing, since they are playing a large portion of the game. On the other hand, a 
less skilled player has less opportunities to make an impact since only 5 players on the team are 
on the court at one time. Considering only the regular season a basketball player can play for an 
entire game for all 82 games (35 minutes for 75 games is more reasonable but the former is still 
possible), whereas a football player is on the field for roughly half the game, if their offense is on 
the field the same amount as the defense, if they play every snap for 16 games. Although a single 
play or performance has a greater impact on the season outcome in football than in basketball; a 
higher skilled basketball player will be able to provide more consistent value to their team over a 
less skilled player to a greater effect than in football.  
 
Furthermore, due to the shorter season and limited time on the field, lucky plays or breakout 
performances are more likely to occur in football than in basketball. This narrows the gap 
between how much value a great player vs. a good player can contribute over the course of a 
season because a good player who gets lucky can provide more value to a team in a game than a 
great player who is more consistent. Consider a highly skilled wide receiver who has 100 yards 
receiving on 11 catches, but on all of those drives they failed to score any points. On the other 
hand, a less skilled wide receiver who had one touchdown catch for 88 yards that was due to a 
free safety tripping. In the context of the game, the great player provided more consistent value, 
but the good player added 6 points to the team and would provide more value to their 
team.  Football is a lower scoring game than basketball so lucky plays in football like a “pick 
six” have a huge effect on the outcome of the game and a lucky play in basketball can result in at 
most 4 points which likely will not affect the game. This sample size issue can also be reflected 
in baseball, where the 162-game season gives more context to the low likelihood of getting a hit. 
 
2.3 Assessing Draft Value in the NBA 
 
In 2007, Dr. Aaron Barzilai explored the often-overlooked topic of draft value in the National 
Basketball Association (Barzilai, 2007). Dr. Barzilai assessed the value of each draft pick using 4 
metrics (Player Efficiency Rating, Player Wins, Win Shares, and Estimated Salary) over 3 
different time periods (career, first 4 years, and years with rookie team) for a total of 12 total 
metrics. But Barzilai decided that estimated salary was only meaningful for the career time 
period, so he considered only 10 metrics. Below are the regression lines for the metrics 
excluding the years with rookie team due the large amount of variability caused by the differing 




Figure 4: Aaron Barzilai Career Relative Draft Value 
 
Figure 5: Aaron Barzilai First 4 Years Relative Draft Value 
The work done by Dr. Barzilai shows that wins are correlated more to where a player was drafted 
than PER. A player who was drafted highly, especially a lottery pick, will almost always see the 
court for a long time. This can be attributed to the fact that higher picks go to lower performing 
teams. These lower performing teams can take longer to develop these young players and the 
talent on the team is lower, so the newly drafted player plays far more minutes than a later draft 
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pick who is playing on a perennial playoff team. Although, for most cases a higher pick (earlier 
selection) is a better player than a lower pick (later selection), there are instances where a later 
pick will produce more value simply because they are given more chances and could be equally 
as talented as a lower pick. These late round picks are referred to as steals in the draft and the 
non-producing early picks are called busts. But in order to figure out if a player is a steal or a 
bust, they need to have time on the court to showcase their talents. Due to a larger proportion of 
higher picks getting playing time it makes sense that most people can think of examples of draft 
busts but not many examples of draft steals. Looking forward, our project will attempt to better 
quantify what value a player contributes to their team which may shine light on more draft steals. 
 
2.4 Predicting NBA success based on college performance 
 
In American professional sports leagues, drafts are conducted to introduce young talent fairly to 
all teams. Generally, pick order is decided by inverse order of record, so that worse teams have 
the first selections and the best chance at picking a superstar. While this system sounds airtight in 
theory, equality has been increasingly vapid in the NBA. The teams with poor scouting 
departments-whether it be from personnel or budget limitations-find themselves anchored to the 
bottom of the standings and making early draft selections each year. Thus, the challenge is to 
accurately identify successful players from leagues all over the world, using limited data. 
 
Purely numerical statistics are not enough to evaluate a player, however. Players who struggle to 
make NBA rosters have experienced incredible success in international leagues, with Jimmer 
Fredette and Stephon Marbury two prime examples.  The NCAA is the closest thing to a level 
playing field NBA teams have to evaluate talent against, as amateur student-athletes play for 
their college teams. Analysts have used numerical statistics and size in conjunction with 
subjective scouting to try to predict professional success for collegiate players, to reasonable 
success. Others try to directly find a relationship between college statistical production and NBA 
production. What all past models have not done, however, is taking each unique school into 
consideration when evaluating the likelihood of them making the NBA. Even within the same 
conference, certain teams are far more likely to send players to professional leagues than others.  
 
2.5 Summary 
Overall, we understand that many schools of thought have produced many different numbers to 
evaluate basketball players. Due to the game’s free-flowing nature, quantifying every effort a 
player contributes to a team is extremely challenging. Only with recent advancements in player-
tracking data are teams beginning to find ways to measure defensive capability, and other factors 
previously considered intangible. 
For the specific application of the draft, relative value is a crucial component of the NFL 
landscape, where the lengthy draft process leads to many draft pick-only trades. In the NBA, 
there is a sizable gap in the analysis of draft value, and a lack of discussion regarding the most 
important statistics to consider when evaluating a prospective talent. We designed our 
experiments to address these gaps, providing draft value charts for the NBA with statistical rigor, 
and discovering the most important factors for predicting NCAA DI athlete success in the NBA 






3. Design and Methodology 
3.1 Determining Scope of the Project 
The NBA has had extensive changes to its rules, restrictions on eligibility and size as an 
association since its creation. In order to best evaluate a modern-day player and produce metrics 
for their value, it was imperative to consider the time period of the NBA we would include in our 
dataset. We opted to use data from 1990-2018 in our project. The majority of NBA rules have 
remained consistent during this timeframe, with one exception being the three-point line’s move 
from 23 feet 9 inches uniformly to 22 feet in 1995 and subsequent extension at the top of the key 
(corner remained at 22 feet) to 23 feet 9 inches. In the 1990’s, more rule changes altered the way 
on-ball defense was played, removing the ability for the defender to ‘hand check’ the offensive 
player. This change was implemented to aid offensive players, making the games higher scoring 
and thus more entertaining. An important period captured in this dataset is the Jordan years of 
the NBA. Although not a definitive time period, the NBA in the 90’s was focused on physical, 
defensive play (as demonstrated by the Detroit Pistons’ “Bad Boys”) to a more offensive and 
point producing league in the 2000’s, with the 3-point explosion revolutionizing the game in the 
2010’s.  
 
3.2 Collection and Manipulation of the Data 
In order to collect the data for our project, we utilized web scraping techniques through the 
Python package Beautifulsoup. We obtained our information from Basketball-Reference.com 
which had all of the player data required for the analysis. To produce our dataset, we first 
iterated through each season and then for each season pulled the player information from three 
tables. Thee three tables were “per-game”, “total” and “advanced.” Each of these tables has 
every player who played a game in that season within the table. Once all of these tables were 
saved to local spreadsheets, we created functions that cumulatively combined the seasons of data 
which outputted a single spreadsheet with per-game statistics, total statistics, and advanced 
statistics for every player in every season they played in the NBA since 1990. To produce the 
cumulative metric, we also needed to pull data on all-star selections and seasonal awards. We 
again utilized basketball-reference as for each year they had tables of award summaries that 
included all award-winning players. These awards were transformed into their own respective 
column where a 1 indicated they achieved that award and a 0 meant they did not.  
 
3.3 Analyze existing basketball player performance metrics 
In professional sports, ‘value’ can be quantified in many ways. Some measures look purely at 
statistical output, whereas others take factors such as contract cost, minutes played, and team 
wins into account. To contextualize our entire project, which involves measuring the 
performance of basketball players, we analyzed the common metrics used to evaluate players. 
These four metrics were Player Efficiency Rating (PER), Win Shares (WS), Value over 




3.4 Feature engineer new player performance metrics addressing shortcomings with 
existing metrics 
After analyzing the existing player performance metrics, we identified potential areas for 
improvement with different metrics that allowed for a more accurate comparison of players in 
the same season. These metrics were called Basic Percentile (BP) and Advanced Percentile (AP). 
Additionally, we created a metric which rewarded recognition rather than statistical output, 
called Cumulative Individual Accolades (CIA). 
 
3.5 Find the highest value picks based on various measures of cost 
One of the most important applications of talent evaluation is the NBA Draft. Each of the thirty 
teams are assigned two picks, generally in inverse order of team wins. A lottery is conducted for 
the first fourteen picks, to disincentivize intentional losing of games (commonly referred to as 
‘tanking’) to obtain a highly talented player with the first pick. The NBA rookie salary scale 
provides an approximation of the talent level available at each pick, which we use with the 
performance metrics to find the draft picks which provide the highest output per dollar. 
 
3.6 Calculate the approximate value of every pick in the NBA Draft 
Another possibility in the NBA Draft is pick trading. Both before and during the draft, teams can 
swap picks for players or even high picks for multiple lower picks. As such, knowing the value 
of each position in the draft is critical to teams trying to improve their talent. We use the 
performance metrics to analyze the drop-off in talent at each pick in the draft.  
 
3.7 Create a Jimmy Johnson-style NBA Draft value chart 
Pick trading is far more common in the National Football League (NFL) where there are 224 
picks between 32 teams. NFL Analyst Jimmy Johnson created a draft chart in the early 1990’s 
which seeks to quantitatively evaluate the talent available at each pick. We apply this to the NBA 
and create a value chart which accurately matches past draft pick trades in the NBA.  
 
3.8 Summary 
Overall, the key goals of this project section are to identify new avenues for basketball player 
performance evaluation and using that knowledge to generate useful information regarding the 
value of draft picks. We verify our approach through comparing the results to existing research 




4.1 Analyze existing basketball player performance metrics 
As discussed in the previous section, a crucial decision in evaluating player value is how 
‘performance’ is quantified. Figure 6 lists the top 20 players ranked using the four existing 
metrics, averaged out over the course of each player’s career. 
 
Starting at the top, we can see that 
there’s a reasonable consensus 
among the top three players. 
Beyond that, the metrics begin 
disagreeing quite significantly. For 
example, Michael Jordan earns 
third place in Win Shares and 
VORP, but doesn’t feature in the 
top 20 for Fantasy Points. Because 
Win Shares distributes production 
by the number of wins the teams 
accrues, players on successful 
teams (such as the 90’s Bulls, 
arguably the greatest team ever) 
will feature strongly in the WS 
rankings. Similarly, Magic 
Johnson’s extremely strong Lakers 
teams boosts his WS rank to 9, 
which is the only time he features in 
these standings.  
 
Extrapolating from this chart, if 
these metrics disagree so 
significantly for the absolute best 
players, it’s likely that mediocre 
players will also have large 
disparities in their statistical 
rankings by each metric. 
 
 
Player WS PER VORP FP AVG 
LeBron James 1 2 1 1 1.3 
Karl Malone 2 4 2 2 2.5 
David Robinson 4 1 4 5 3.5 
Tim Duncan 8 6 9 4 6.8 
Chris Paul 5 7 5 11 7.0 
Kevin Durant 7 8 15 7 9.3 
Shaquille O’Neal 14 3 18 3 9.5 
Michael Jordan 3 11 3 21 9.5 
Charles Barkley 10 5 6 21 10.5 
Russell Westbrook 21 16 8 6 12.8 
Kevin Garnett 17 17 12 8 13.5 
John Stockton 6 13 19 16 13.5 
Hakeem Olajuwon 21 10 17 10 14.5 
James Harden 12 21 11 17 15.3 
Clyde Drexler 16 19 7 21 15.8 
Stephen Curry 15 21 10 19 16.3 
Kobe Bryant 20 15 21 13 17.3 
Dirk Nowitzki 13 18 21 18 17.5 
Magic Johnson 9 21 21 21 18.0 
Dwight Howard 18 21 21 12 18.0 
Yao Ming 21 9 21 21 18.0 
Allen Iverson 21 21 21 9 18.0 
Jason Kidd 21 21 16 15 18.3 
Dwyane Wade 21 12 20 21 18.5 
Reggie Miller 11 21 21 21 18.5 
Scottie Pippen 21 21 13 21 19.0 
Larry Bird 21 21 14 21 19.3 
Anthony Davis 21 14 21 21 19.3 
Gary Payton 21 21 21 14 19.3 
Jeff Hornacek 19 21 21 21 20.5 
Amare Stoudemire 21 20 21 21 20.8 
Patrick Ewing 21 21 21 20 20.8 




To investigate just what these statistical 
disparities might be, we broke down each metric 
to its mathematical formula, to see their 
components. We were particularly interested in 
the components which normalized each metric, 
displayed in Figure 7. 
 
Fantasy Points is the most basic metric – it 
multiplies each basic ‘counting stat’ by a 
coefficient and outputs a number representing 
the volume of statistical output by a player. The 
coefficients seek to equalize the value of assists, 
rebounds, and points. FP does not consider the 
player’s efficiency, or pace of play. Obviously, 
20 points in a game ending 74-68 is more 
valuable than 25 points in a 135-123 game, but 
FP would rank the latter performance as 
stronger. By normalizing to pace, the metric 
would consider the amount of points the player 
scored per 100 possessions, allowing for a more 
accurate comparison.  
 
In that case, let’s now move to PER, a stat which is normalized to pace, as well as minutes 
played. It multiplies counting stats by coefficients and analyzes the proportion of team field 
goals the player’s assists contribute towards. Additionally, PER subtracts what its creator, John 
Hollinger, calls “negative accomplishments” such as turnovers, personal fouls, and missed 
defensive rebounds. PER’s largest flaw is its greatest strength- minutes normalization. Because 
of limited sample size, the player with the all-time highest PER has only played a few minutes. 
Adding minimum games or minutes played removes these outliers, but on the other end, players 
who make significant contributions during their prime, only to decrease in efficiency in their 
career’s twilight are prone to having a low career average PER. 
 
As such, there is no true ‘best metric’ for evaluating talent. Undoubtedly, every player on this list 
is a great player in their own right, but such significant difference in the ranking suggests there 
might be a better way to evaluate talent. 
 
4.2 Feature engineer new player performance metrics addressing shortcomings with 
existing metrics 
 
4.2.1 Cumulative Individual Accolades 
 
When fans compare players, they often point to the number of individual awards a player accrues 
over their career. With that in mind, we sought to quantify these awards by examining the 
mathematical chance that a player accomplishes a certain milestone if all players were randomly 
selected. 




The baseline accomplishment is being named in the 12 active players for each game, which we 
assign one point to each player. From there, five players are named to the starting lineup (5/12), 
which is equivalent to 2.4 points. We follow the same methodology for playing a minute on the 
court, all the way to winning the MVP, which is a 1/450 chance (given 15 players on 30 teams’ 
rosters), thus awarding 450 points. 















































Figure 8: CIA Equation 
  
Figure 9 shows the top 10 players as ranked by CIA for 
2018. Victor Oladipo won Most Improved Player, made the 
All-NBA Defensive Team and the All-NBA Third Team. 
James Harden won MVP and was named to the All-NBA 
First Team. Because the statistical likelihood of making the 
Third Team is equivalent to making the First Team, it 
slightly muddies the data. Similarly, Most Improved Player 
awards the same points as MVP. While this metric was an 
interesting twist on the typical in-game analysis of player 
performance, we found it to be inappropriate to further 
analyze players using this metric. 
 
 
Player 2018 CIA 
Victor Oladipo 1242 
James Harden 1152 
Rudy Gobert 976 
Anthony Davis 835 
Lou Williams 832 
LeBron James 816 
Jrue Holiday 792 
Karl-Anthony Towns 791 
Russell Westbrook 789 
Figure 9: CIA Top 10 
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4.2.2 Basic Percentile 
There are five major ‘counting stats’ in basketball 
and are the basis for almost all stats as they tally a 
player’s basic contributions to their team. The five 
stats are points, assists, rebounds, blocks and steals. 
We felt that there was a need to develop a stat that 
was basic, yet still provided the normalization in the 
other metrics. When viewing Figure 10, we realized 
we were not considering stats that looked at the 
volume produced by a player that only be adjusted to 
the season they played in. This last clarification is an 
important one because the speed of the game has 
increased since the first seasons we were comparing. 
It would be unfair and improper to treat every season 
equally and just take the raw outputs of players for 
these five categories. The pace of the game is higher 
so there are more points being scored which means 
more assists and rebounds to be had.   
Figure 10: All metrics Venn diagram 
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With this in mind, we decided to rank every player by the average of their five major stat 
categories. The equation is similar to Efficiency but removes the negative parts of the equation 
and instead ranks the players based on their relative performance compared to the rest of the 
league. 
 
Efficiency = (Points + Rebounds + Assists + Steals + Blocks) - ((Field Goals Att. - Field Goals Made) + (Free 
Throws Att. - Free Throws Made) + Turnovers) 
 
Basic Percentile 
Each of the five major stat categories turn into ranking where a players rank is determined with the following: 
Let X be the stat in question: 
 
X_Rank = sort(All players by X in non increasing order) 
 
E.g. The player who scores the fewest points will be given the PPG_Rank = 1 and the league leader in points will 
have a PPG_Rank of N, where N is the number of players in that season. 
 
Basic Percentile = 




The reason that we divide by 5 is to get the average rank for all of the 5 major stat categories and we also divide by 
N to get the percentile of where that player stands off of the total possible score that is achievable. The 
multiplication by 100 is simply move the metric two decimal places to the right so that the results is easier to read. 
 
The stat gives a raw number that can range from 0-100 and is adjusted to a per season output. A 
player who leads the league in year X but averages 20 points will get the same PPG_Rank as a 
player who leads the league in year Y and 
averages 45 points. 
 
The table to the left is the top 20 basic 
percentile scores since 1990. The reason we 
believe this metric adds value is it highlights 
the “stat stuffers” of the NBA, it recognizes 
the players who have a propensity to add value 
in all of the major aspects of the game. The 
idea of adding weights to each of the 5 stat 
categories was considered. A valid argument 
for doing so would be since assisting is a vital 
role to a point guard, we should weigh assists 
higher than rebounds, a stat usually tied to 
forwards and centers. For example, a point 
guard who leads the league in assists but is 
200th in rebounds can get the same basic 
percentile score as another point guard who is 
say 50th in the league for assists and 150th in 
rebounds. Some would argue that the league 
leading assist point guard is providing more 
value. And in a future iteration perhaps 
weighting will be added. But the purpose of 
Player Age BPercentile 
Giannis Antetokounmpo 22 94.53 
DeMarcus Cousins 27 94.37 
DeMarcus Cousins 26 93.37 
Giannis Antetokounmpo 23 93.15 
Hakeem Olajuwon 32 92.43 
Kevin Garnett 27 92.22 
Hakeem Olajuwon 33 92.03 
David Robinson 28 92.01 
DeMarcus Cousins 24 91.99 
DeMarcus Cousins 25 91.97 
LeBron James 33 91.96 
Hakeem Olajuwon 30 91.95 
LeBron James 23 91.93 
LeBron James 24 91.87 
LeBron James 25 91.86 
LeBron James 28 91.86 
Kevin Garnett 28 91.64 
Chris Webber 26 91.53 
Chris Webber 23 91.52 
Chris Webber 29 91.50 




this stat was to eliminate raw numbers and fancy equations so equally rating all stat categories 
the same made the most sense. 
 
 
4.2.3 Advanced Percentile 
When evaluating the results and rankings generated by basic percentile it became obvious that 
there was an aspect missing to the metric. Since basic percentile only looks at per game metrics 
those players who play more minutes per game were more likely to get higher basic percentile 
scores. Although minutes played is a good indicator of their perceived value on the team, one of 
the goals of this project was to try and find undervalued players. For this reason, there was a 
natural progression which led to the creation of a new metric we call advanced percentile. 
Instead of looking at raw per game stats, we were now going to calculate the 5 core stats not by 
their per game output but their accompanying percent metrics.  
Therefore the 5 stats we used were TS%*, AST%, TRB%, BLK%, STL%. 
They are calculated by the following equations: 
 
TS% = PTS / (2 * FGA + 0.44 * FTA) 
 
*The reason we used true shooting percentage is because our data source did not have a metric that fit the same 
style as the stats below for points. It could have been possible to calculate a similar metric but we reasoned that 
although true shooting percentage does not take into account how many points a player scored highlighting the 
efficiency with which they do score we saw as fairly similar in value. In future work it might be best to reevaluate 
this stat to the Points% which could be calculated with the following equation: Points% = 100* Points/ (((MP / 
(Tm MP/ 5)) * Tm Points). But since our data source had the below stats but not a metric like the above we decided 
to use TS%. 
 
AST% = 100 * AST / (((MP / (Tm MP/ 5)) * Tm FG) - FG) 
TRB% = 100 * (TRB * (TmMP / 5)) / (MP * (Tm TRB + Opp TRB)). 
BLK% = 100 * (BLK * (Tm MP / 5)) / (MP * (Opp FGA - Opp 3PA)) 
STL% = 100 * (STL * (Tm MP / 5)) / (MP * Opp Poss) 
 
Advanced Percentile 
Each of the five major stat categories turn into ranking where a players rank is determined with the following: 
Let X be the stat in question: 
 
X_Rank = sort(All players by X in non increasing order) 
 
E.g. The player who scores with the lowest TS% will be given the TS%_Rank = 1 and the league leader in TS% will 
have a TS%_Rank of N, where N is the number of players in that season. 
 
Advanced Percentile = 


















The table to the left shows the top 20 advanced 
percentile scores since 1990. This table is far 
more interesting to look at as there are players 
who are not considered all time players like 
previous metrics we have seen. For example 
Cole Aldrich when he was 27 (2015-2016 
season with the Clippers). In that season he had 
a TS% of 62.6, TRB% of 19.6, AST% of 10%, 
BLK % of 6.7, and STL% of 2.9 while playing 
13.3 minutes per game.  In that season there 
was 475 players (N=475) and his rankings were 
the following.  
TS%_Rank 452/475 = 95.2 
AST%_Rank 238/475 = 50.1 
TRB%_Rank 459/475 = 96.6 
BLK%_Rank 468 /475 = 98.5 
STL%_Rank 453/475 = 96.4 
 
 
There are two arguments that can be made from his relatively low minutes per game, either this 
stat overvalues performance for players who play few minutes or Cole Aldrich should have 
played more minutes that season. Both are rationale and could be explained but it is worth noting 
that Cole Aldrich had a WS/48 of 0.209 which is reasonably high (243rd all-time best single 
season WS/48) and is behind only the career WS/48 averages of Michael Jordan, George Mikan, 
LeBron James and Kawhi Leonard. But regardless of whether Cole Aldrich is being over valued 
from this metric is not a concern. The purpose of this metric was to highlight seasons like this 
which are too often overlooked. Of course, there are players who are overvalued from this 
metric. The leader in TS% from the 2015-2016 year was Rakeem Christmas who had a TS% of 
1.00 because he took two shots in 6 minutes and made both and then never played again that 
year. But this metric also highlights the seasons like Cole Aldrich’s and Oliver Miller’s which 
are overlooked and forgotten but show promise in terms of providing value. 
   
Player Age A Percentile 
Giannis Antetokounmpo 22 87.53 
Cole Aldrich 27 86.97 
David Robinson 26 86.89 
Hakeem Olajuwon 30 86.51 
Oliver Miller 23 86.25 
Shawn Kemp 24 86.20 
Andrei Kirilenko 23 85.99 
Kevin Garnett 31 85.90 
Kevin Garnett 28 85.82 
Kevin Garnett 29 85.76 
David Robinson 28 85.61 
DeMarcus Cousins 27 85.59 
Kevin Garnett 27 85.34 
Jordan Bell 23 85.33 
David West 37 85.30 
Arvydas Sabonis 38 84.91 
LeBron James 28 84.78 
Andrei Kirilenko 22 84.75 
Draymond Green 25 84.29 
DeMarcus Cousins 24 84.23 
Figure 12: Top 20 Advanced Percentile 
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4.3 Calculate the approximate value of every pick in the NBA Draft 
 
Following our analysis of existing metrics, and construction of BP and AP, we then group 
players based on their draft position. First, we summed up the total value of each metric of each 
draft pick. We included non-drafted players as ‘Pick 61’, which is displayed on the below graph. 
 
 
This graph is oversensitive to extremely good players, which makes the graph jagged. 
Additionally, it is notable that undrafted free agents are typically more productive than the final 
few picks. A potential reason for this is that they’re generally older and are more prepared for the 
rigors of the NBA. In order to provide a more accurate curve, we cluster the draft picks into 
groups. These groups are 1-3, 4-7, 8-14, 15-30, 31-45, and 46-60. We felt these clusters fall in 





























Career Cumulative Relative Value for NBA Draft
Cumulative Normalized PER Cumulative Normalized WS
Cumulative Normalized VORP Cumulative Normalized Basic Percentile
Cumulative Normalized Advanced Percentile Cumulative Normalized Fantasy Points




This graph provides a much clearer picture of the values of each metric. Also featured in this 
graph is the NBA Rookie Salary scale. As there is no mandatory salary for second round picks, 
we use the league minimum salary. We also display the number of players calculated in each 
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Figure 14: Clustered Career Relative NBA Draft Value 
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Poly. (Normalized Basic Percentile)
Poly. (Normalized Advanced Percentile)
Log. (Normalized Fantasy Points)
Log. (Normalized Rookie Salary)
Figure 15: Trendline Clustered Cumulative Relative NBA Draft Value 
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4.4 Find the highest value picks based on various measure of cost 
First, we use the obvious measure of cost, salary, to divide the pick values by. This shows where 
the best ‘bang-for-the-buck’ can be found in the NBA draft. We again use the clustering 
technique to clearly visualize the curves. 
 
 
As shown, the metrics disagree greatly in where the highest value can be found. Advanced 
Percentile suggests the early second round has the best value players, but VORP values the top 















































Figure 16: Value per dollar for NBA Rookies 
23 
 
4.5 Create a Jimmy Johnson-style NBA Draft pick value chart 
 
We created draft value charts for each pick. NFL Analyst Rich Hill 
used Jimmy Johnson’s chart as a baseline to evaluate draft-pick only 
trades to create a new draft value chart. With this in mind, we found 
an assortment of draft-pick only trades in the NBA to evaluate each 
of the draft charts and select a ‘best’ chart. 
 
Clearly, VORP is the most accurate chart. In addition to the 
numerical output of the trade evaluator, selecting VORP is intuitive 
because it does not cloud the statistical value of a player by 
normalizing output to wins. On the flip side, because VORP is 
normalized to pace and minutes played, this provides a more 
objective value of a hypothetical player who would have equal 
opportunity on each team. 
 
Position VORP Position VORP Position VORP Position VORP 
1 3000 16 1082 31 390 46 141 
2 2803 17 1011 32 364 47 131 
3 2619 18 944 33 340 48 123 
4 2446 19 882 34 318 49 115 
5 2286 20 824 35 297 50 107 
6 2135 21 770 36 278 51 100 
7 1995 22 719 37 259 52 94 
8 1864 23 672 38 242 53 87 
9 1741 24 628 39 226 54 82 
10 1627 25 587 40 212 55 76 
11 1520 26 548 41 198 56 71 
12 1420 27 512 42 185 57 67 
13 1327 28 478 43 172 58 62 
14 1239 29 447 44 161 59 58 
15 1158 30 418 45 151 60 54 



















Figure 17: Mean Absolute Error of 




Compared to the NFL, the NBA follows a different level of apparent talent drop-off. 
 
For the first 20 picks, NBA talent is relatively better than the same draft pick in the NFL, 
according to both Kevin Pelton and Jimmy Johnson’s charts. After that point, Jimmy Johnson’s 
chart suggest NFL talent is more valuable from picks 20-60. On the other hand, Kevin Pelton’s 
chart closely mirrors the NBA value chart through to the end of the NBA Draft.  
  














NBA vs NFL Draft Value
NBA VORP NFL Jimmy Johnson NFL Kevin Pelton NBA Barzilai
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5. Design and Methodology for NCAA  
5.1 Create a model which predicts various measures of NBA success based on NCAA DI 
statistics 
Following our draft analysis, we pivoted to a more predictive analytics problem. We sought to 
create models which predicted the best players each year in the NCAA. The NCAA is the 
primary feeder league for the NBA, so creating a system which models this is critical.  
 
The data we had collected during the first phase of the project lent itself to using primarily draft-
based criteria. From the draft position column, we were able to create ‘wasDrafted’, 
‘wasFirstRoundPick’, and ‘wasLotteryPick’ fields. By looking up the college player on the pro 
basketball-reference site, we were able to infer if they ever saw the court for an NBA game.  
 
With four classification targets, we experimented with different machine learning models to find 
the best fit for each problem. The four models we investigated were: 
- Logistic Regression 
- Decision Tree 
- Random Forest 
- Multilayer Perceptron (Neural Networks) 
 
We first used the GridSearchCV function to explore a range of parameters for each model, and 
then used the best of each individual model in competition with each other. We printed 
classification reports for all the models and found that Logistic Regression was the most 
successful model for all four target classifiers. 
 
Once we had a grasp on the value of a player and the expected value from a given draft pick, we 
set out to predict NBA performance for NCAA Division I players. To do this, we first needed to 
gather statistics about all NCAA Division I players. Using the same methodology to pull data 
from Basketball-Refernce.com, we were able to obtain college data from Sports-Reference.com. 
We were able to pull data from all NCAA division I teams from 2000 – 2018. But due to the lack 
of consistent IDs for an NCAA player (the ids used in sports reference are not the same as the 
ones used in basketball reference), we needed to manually enter when a player was drafted and 
so we focused on college players from 2010 to 2018. When we were evaluating NBA player 
performance, only in game performance was accounted for, but physical attributes are an 
important component of evaluating NBA readiness. Thus, we also used height and weight 
measurements for all NCAA players. To further investigate how physical attributes play a role in 
NBA success, we also collected data from the NBA Draft Combine from 2010-2018.  
 
After collecting all the above data, we used Python with sklearn, a machine learning package, to 
predict whether or not a player would make the NBA. We defined making the NBA as playing in 
an official game during the NBA season. This excludes players who were drafted and never 
played a game, as well as those who signed contracts and were on NBA rosters but failed to play 
in a game. These distinctions echo the distinctions that are enforced on the sports reference page 
in order for a college player to be considered having gone on to play in the NBA. We created and 
ran a logistic regression, decision tree classifier, random forest classifier, MLP classifier, and 
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Zero R model to see which model would be best at predicting whether a player would make the 
NBA. The Zero R model, predicting every player as never making the NBA, was going to be our 
baseline. Since the vast majority of NCAA DI players never make the NBA, a model that 
predicts no one will make the NBA is still correct over 99% of the time. But in order to tell a 
story worth listening to we needed to predict the players who did end up making the NBA.  
 
Once we had a clean dataset, we used stratified sampling to split the data proportionally based on 
class value. We also normalized the non-target attributes, to make sure no attribute was being 
artificially weighed more than another. We tinkered with the parameters for each of the models, 
until we found the best performing set of parameters for each model. At that point, we ran our 
experiments on each of the 
target classes, which were: 
madeNBA, wasDrafted, 
firstRound and lotteryPick. 
We then used sk-learn’s 
classification_report to 
print the resulting 
precision, recall, accuracy, 
and f1 score for each of the 
classes.  
 
To improve the prediction 
ability of our model, while 
also using realistic sub 
sections of NCAA DI 
players, we broke up our 
dataset into the following 
categories. 
 
Freshmen only: We 
decided that it would be 
appropriate to only look at 
players who were in their 
freshmen year because the trend of freshmen being drafted, especially in lottery selections, has 
been increasing (seen in Figure 20). From our previous work on NBA performance and the 
expected value of a pick it was appropriate to put an extra consideration on lottery picks. In the 
2018 draft 11 of the 15 lottery picks were freshmen, the other four being international player at 
3, junior at 10, sophomore at 12, and junior at 13. In the 2017 draft 11 of the 15 lottery picks 
were also freshmen. The other four being international at 8, sophomore at 12, sophomore at 13, 
and junior 15. 
 
Last Year of College: We decided that including the last year a player played would be a good 
sub section of players to consider as well. This is because this subsection inherently captures a 
player’s last season which could be argued is most likely their best season. 
 
Figure 20: Increasing numbers of freshmen in the NBA (Reynon, 2018) 
27 
 
Note: due to an overwhelming amount of empty data points in the combine anthropology and 
agility datasets we didn’t include these metrics. This is due to three main issues, the first is that 
players who attend the combine rarely perform all the tests, the second is the most notable 
college players rarely perform any of the tests if they attend at all (the vast majority of NCAA 
players also do not attend) and lastly the combine usually occurs only a month before the NBA 
draft and by then most scouts/ fans have already decided who they feel are most draft worthy. 
For these reasons, we decided that adding the combine metrics to our machine learning models 




The prediction of whether an NCAA DI player would achieve our target classes, madeNBA, 
wasDrafted, firstRound, and lotteryPick, are based on machine learning models that trained on 
thousands of recent NCAA DI player’s seasons. We conducted these experiments with multiple 
machine learning models, including logistic regression, decision trees, random forests, neural 
nets, and Zero R classifier (as our baseline). We trained and tested these models on all NCAA DI 
seasons from the freshmen class of 2012 until 2018 and on two subsections of NCAA DI players, 
freshmen year only and last year of college, to maximize our machine leaning model’s predictive 
ability. The results of this aspect of our project can help NBA teams verify their scouting reports 




6. Results for NCAA  
To generate the most meaningful conclusions and create the best predicting model for NCAA DI 
players we tested multiple machine learning models on our data. First, we ran each model 
individually, tweaking the hyperparameters to find the best individual model performance. Then, 
we evaluated how good a model was by its ability to predict the target attribute, in this case 
Made NBA, with the entire dataset. We considered the best model to be the model with the 
highest f1 score for the Made NBA class. Below are the statistics for each model. 
 
 
We ran the above test with multiple seeds and each time the logistic regression proved to be our 
best model. In particular, the multilayer perceptron (neural networks) model was particularly 
volatile based on the random seed. As a result, we use only logistic regression when analyzing 
different scopes and target we were trying to predict. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, we ran twelve experiments featuring four different targets 
and three distinct datasets. In the interest of brevity, and in order to extract the most meaningful 
conclusions possible, we have selected the target attribute from each dataset which resulted in 
the best predictive model. The results of all twelve experiments can be found in the appendices.  
 
Finally, we ran all four experiments once again on the test set of 2018-19 NCAA players to 
observe our model’s predictions for the upcoming 2019 NBA Draft. 
 
6.1 Using all seasons of NCAA DI players 
The first group of NCAA DI players that we considered was every season played by every player 
since the freshmen class of 2012. As mentioned in the design, we excluded players who were not 
freshmen in 2012 because their previous years were outside of our dataset. Because we initially 
Figure 21: Model experimentation results 
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read in all 2012 players onwards, we confused 2012 seniors with freshmen, thus prompting the 
shift to 2012 freshmen and beyond only.  
 
The following subsections are the logistic regression’s precision, recall and f1 scores for the best 
target prediction, starting with the entire dataset. This dataset features every player’s season as an 
individual row. Because the data labels a season as being enough to achieve a target, as opposed 
to a player, the data has multiple rows for the same player with different target values. 
 
Using the entire dataset described above, we found that the best model predicted NCAA DI 
players being drafted into the NBA.  
 
 
Figure 22: All NCAA season wasDrafted metrics 
 
While initially, the 0.53 f1-score doesn’t sound promising, we created a function to map the 
predictions back to the players’ names and then researched their backgrounds. Below is a graph 
displaying each season as a circle, with the color corresponding the prediction the model made 
and its correctness. On the x-axis is the numerical value between 0 and 1 that the model 
predicted for that season. For a logistic regression, a number above 0.5 is determined to be a 1, 
and vice versa. While the perfect model would have no false negatives or false positives, we 
would be more confident in a model which has the incorrect predictions concentrated around the 





Figure 23: All NCAA seasons wasDrafted breakdown 
 
Most of the players analyzed have an extremely low chance of being drafted, as expected. We 
found more misses than originally anticipated. From our manual research of the wrongly 
predicted players, we made an interesting discovery- the model predicted all but one player 
correctly, with the caveat of them returning to college for another year. 
 
Yellow – Returned to college and was drafted into the NBA 
Blue – Plays internationally 
Name Year Predicted Actual Draft Probability Miss Type 
Delon Wright 2013-14 1 0 95.4% not 
Marcus Smart 2012-13 1 0 88.1% not 
Kyle Anderson 2012-13 1 0 85.2% not 
Alec Peters 2015-16 1 0 82.7% not 
Johnathan Motley 2016-17 1 0 76.7% not 
Kris Dunn 2014-15 1 0 75.4% not 
Montrezl Harrell 2013-14 1 0 71.9% not 
Alec Peters 2014-15 1 0 58.9% not 
Daniel Hamilton 2014-15 1 0 57.2% not 
Josh Scott 2015-16 1 0 52.5% not 
Denzel Valentine 2014-15 1 0 52.0% not 
Shane Larkin 2012-13 0 1 46.7% made 
Chris McCullough 2014-15 0 1 40.8% made 
Sviatoslav Mykhailiuk 2017-18 0 1 40.8% made 
Rondae Hollis-Jefferson 2014-15 0 1 37.3% made 
Robbie Hummel 2011-12 0 1 28.9% made 
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Bruce Brown 2017-18 0 1 18.7% made 
Khyri Thomas 2017-18 0 1 15.9% made 
Branden Dawson 2014-15 0 1 15.9% made 
Otto Porter 2012-13 0 1 14.5% made 
Devon Hall 2017-18 0 1 13.5% made 
Vince Edwards 2017-18 0 1 11.0% made 
Jevon Carter 2017-18 0 1 11.0% made 
Richaun Holmes 2014-15 0 1 8.7% made 
Hamidou Diallo 2017-18 0 1 8.2% made 
Zach LaVine 2013-14 0 1 5.2% made 
Edmond Sumner 2016-17 0 1 5.1% made 
OG Anunoby 2016-17 0 1 4.2% made 
Deyonta Davis 2015-16 0 1 4.0% made 
Grant Jerrett 2012-13 0 1 3.4% made 
Harry Giles 2016-17 0 1 3.3% made 
Ike Anigbogu 2016-17 0 1 2.6% made 
J.P. Tokoto 2014-15 0 1 2.2% made 
DeAndre Bembry 2015-16 0 1 2.2% made 
Chimezie Metu 2017-18 0 1 2.2% made 
Kevin Hervey 2017-18 0 1 1.5% made 
Sam Dekker 2014-15 0 1 0.6% made 
Jordan Clarkson 2013-14 0 1 0.4% made 
Tyler Harvey 2014-15 0 1 0.2% made 
Figure 24: All NCAA seasons wasDrafted misses 
Considering all the players the model predicted to be drafted, only one player was actually not 
drafted. Because a player must forego their college career when declaring for the NBA Draft, 
this means that the model was in fact extremely good at detecting draftable players, before they 
even finished their careers. While the model did miss on a number of solid players, such as Otto 
Porter and Zach LaVine, we can be confident that when our model does identify a player as 
draftable, it is likely correct. 
 
One interesting insight from the model is what it views as the most important predictors for 
either success or failure in the NBA. Below are the top 10 positive and negative coefficients for 
the statistics used.  
 
Metric Weight Metric Weight 
MP -1.034 Height 1.123 
G -0.8395 WS 0.8628 
FT -0.5135 TOV 0.5359 
2P -0.5004 AST 0.4644 
AST% -0.4954 USG% 0.4493 
Grade -0.3910 2PA 0.4407 
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TS% -0.3733 FGA 0.4378 
PF -0.3644 BPM 0.3601 
PER -0.2657 PProd 0.3110 
GS -0.2333 OBPM 0.3055 
Figure 25: All NCAA seasons wasDrafted coefficients 
 
For the remainder of the experiments involving this dataset, see Appendix A. 
 
6.2 Using only freshmen year seasons 
 
The second scope of NCAA DI players that we considered was only looking at a player’s 
freshmen year. The rationale behind this decision was that ‘one-and-done’ players who go to the 
NBA are likely to show anomalous statistical output, and thus be easily detected by the model. 
The best target attribute for this model was making the NBA, defined as entering a game and 
playing at least one second.  
 
 






Figure 27: NCAA Freshmen madeNBA breakdown 
There are only four false positives, which is promising. All of them are relatively close to the 0.5 
region. What we found, however, is three of the four did end up playing in the NBA in later 
years. Of particular interest is Malcolm Miller, from Holy Cross. The model predicts him to just 
sneak into the NBA (50.7%) and although he did not declare for the draft until his senior year, 
the model did in fact identify a player at Holy Cross, not typically a basketball powerhouse, who 
made the NBA. 
Yellow – Did make NBA 
Green – Made G League 
Name Year Predicted Actual NBA Probability Miss Type 
Willie Cauley-Stein 2012-13 1 0 81.4% not 
Aaron Harrison 2013-14 1 0 79.7% not 
Melo Trimble 2014-15 1 0 58.1% not 
Malcolm Miller 2013-14 1 0 50.7% not 
Marquis Teague 2011-12 0 1 23.3% made 
Henry Ellenson 2015-16 0 1 15.9% made 
Tyler Ennis 2013-14 0 1 12.8% made 
Chris McCullough 2014-15 0 1 11.0% made 
Justin Patton 2016-17 0 1 9.7% made 
Omari Spellman 2017-18 0 1 8.7% made 
Grant Jerrett 2012-13 0 1 5.3% made 
Deyonta Davis 2015-16 0 1 4.4% made 
Collin Sexton 2017-18 0 1 3.9% made 
Figure 28: NCAA Freshmen madeNBA misses 
34 
 
Collin Sexton is a significant miss, as he played at Alabama and was drafted with the eighth 
overall pick in the 2018 draft. His lack of size and weight at his position could have contributed 
to this result. 
 
Metric Weight Metric Weight 
MP -1.152 TOV 0.6605 
FT -0.3357 FTA 0.4857 
TRB -0.2379 WS 0.4516 
AST -0.2200 Height 0.4005 
incarnate-word -0.1936 kentucky 0.2968 
FG% -0.1901 PER 0.2955 
mississippi -0.1836 OWS 0.2905 
new-mexico-state  -0.1821 duke   0.2824 
north-texas  -0.1783 kansas  0.2775 
morgan-state  -0.1708 BLK 0.2722 
Figure 29: NCAA Freshmen madeNBA coefficients 
 
6.3 Using only a player’s last season 
The last scope of NCAA DI players that we considered was only looking at a player’s last year 
they played in college. This scope should eliminate the issue of returning players for all players 
except players who have not yet left in the 2018-19 season. The best target attribute for this 









Figure 31: NCAA last season firstRound breakdown 
 
Yellow – Second Round Pick 
Green – Undrafted played in G League/ Internationally 
 
Name Year Predicted Actual 1st Round Probability Miss 
Type 
Davon Usher 2013-14 1 0 92.8% not 
Kenny Kadji 2012-13 1 0 78.9% not 
Cleanthony Early 2013-14 1 0 76.9% not 
Romero Osby 2012-13 1 0 57.3% not 
Josh Hart 2016-17 0 1 42.9% made 
Brice Johnson 2015-16 0 1 27.2% made 
D.J. Wilson 2016-17 0 1 25.3% made 
Donte DiVincenzo 2017-18 0 1 22.5% made 
Terry Rozier 2014-15 0 1 20.0% made 
Marquis Teague 2011-12 0 1 17.1% made 
Justin Patton 2016-17 0 1 15.1% made 
Tony Bradley 2016-17 0 1 13.7% made 
Damian Jones 2015-16 0 1 8.6% made 
Henry Ellenson 2015-16 0 1 7.2% made 
Caris LeVert 2015-16 0 1 6.9% made 
R.J. Hunter 2014-15 0 1 6.8% made 
Josh Okogie 2017-18 0 1 4.4% made 
Chandler Hutchison 2017-18 0 1 1.7% made 
Justin Anderson 2014-15 0 1 0.2% made 
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Figure 32: NCAA last season firstRound misses 
The model produced four false positives once again, which is not too bad. All four of the false 
positives are playing professionally at some level, however that is not what the target was 
predicting. 
Metric Weight Metric Weight 
MP -0.5499 OWS 0.6620 
BLK% -0.5127 WS 0.6372 
3P -0.3811 TOV 0.5496 
high-point -0.3048 BLK 0.4379 
G -0.2956 DWS 0.3983 
FT% -0.2919 PProd 0.3709 
north-carolina-central -0.2687 ORB 0.3552 
DRB -0.2686 STL 0.3499 
Albany-ny -0.2644 FTA 0.3425 
middle-tennessee -0.2569 Height 0.3243 
Figure 33: NCAA last season firstRound coefficients 
6.4 Predicting on the 2019 NCAA DI Players 
 
The below table is our projected ordering of how players will be drafted based on the probability 
that our model gave them for chances of making the NBA. 
 
Yellow – Was not on the ESPN top 100 best available players 
 
Pick Team Year Player Prob Pick Team Year  Player Prob 
1 duke 2018-19 
Zion 





2 duke 2018-19 R.J. Barrett 99.09% 32 arkansas 2018-19 
Daniel 
Gafford 40.89% 
3 murray-state 2018-19 Ja Morant 97.64% 33 villanova 2018-19 Eric Paschall 39.61% 
4 kentucky 2018-19 PJ Washington 96.08% 34 virginia 2018-19 
De'Andre 
Hunter 39.50% 
5 furman 2018-19 Matt Rafferty 95.78% 35 louisville 2018-19 
Jordan 
Nwora 39.21% 
6 oregon 2018-19 Bol Bol 93.29% 36 cincinnati 2018-19 
Jarron 
Cumberland 39.10% 
7 kansas 2018-19 Dedric Lawson 92.82% 37 washington 2018-19 
Matisse 
Thybulle 38.71% 











This order is not what we expect to see in the upcoming NBA draft. The only way this would be 
the order is if each team picked the most NBA ready player according to our model. Since teams 
also must pick for positions and needs for their respective teams this approach is flawed in 
accurately predicting how each pick will go. However, often the top picks transcend need and fit 
onto rosters as they are star players. In 2019 Zion Williamson and R.J. Barrett are examples of 
such players as both have been projected top picks since the beginning of the season. Our model 
does value them as the top two picks with over 99% certainty that they will make the NBA. Of 
course, machine learning is not necessary to figure out they will be drafted highly but it is good 
that the model passes the eye test at first glance.  
With more investigation and comparing it to the ESPN top 100 players available as of March 
14th, 2019 looking at solely if the player we predicted is in this list (not concerned with order) 
we see that our model had predicted 34 players who appeared on this top 100 best available 
players. Some of these players were past the 60th best available player but it is worth noting the 
10 wisconsin 2018-19 Ethan Happ 77.26% 40 indiana 2018-19 
Romeo 
Langford 36.63% 
11 duke 2018-19 Cam Reddish 74.67% 41 marquette 2018-19 Sam Hauser 35.56% 
12 kentucky 2018-19 Tyler Herro 73.53% 42 
louisiana-
state 2018-19 Naz Reid 34.06% 












Boatwright 65.88% 45 
north-
carolina 2018-19 Luke Maye 29.06% 
16 marquette 2018-19 Markus Howard 65.78% 46 
north-
carolina 2018-19 Coby White 26.61% 
17 kentucky 2018-19 Keldon Johnson 65.11% 47 syracuse 2018-19 Tyus Battle 26.32% 
18 maryland 2018-19 Bruno Fernando 63.45% 48 iowa-state 2018-19 
Marial 
Shayok 26.19% 





20 north-carolina 2018-19 
Cameron 
Johnson 58.19% 50 
louisiana-
state 2018-19 Skylar Mays 23.27% 





22 ucla 2018-19 Kris Wilkes 51.08% 52 syracuse 2018-19 
Oshae 
Brissett 23.18% 
23 ucla 2018-19 Jaylen Hands 50.83% 53 holy-cross 2018-19 
Jehyve 
Floyd 22.09% 
24 kentucky 2018-19 Reid Travis 49.72% 54 villanova 2018-19 Phil Booth 21.93% 
25 oregon-state 2018-19 Tres Tinkle 49.45% 55 georgetown 2018-19 Jessie Govan 21.48% 
26 
louisiana-





27 kansas 2018-19 
Udoka 
Azubuike 46.79% 57 kansas 2018-19 
Lagerald 
Vick 19.77% 





state 2018-19 Nick Ward 43.40% 59 kentucky 2018-19 
EJ 
Montgomery 18.60% 
30 st-johns-ny 2018-19 Shamorie Ponds 43.36% 60 vermont 2018-19 
Anthony 
Lamb 18.40% 
Figure 34: 2019 NCAA player madeNBA predictions 
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ESPN list also includes 20 players who are international and did not attend a college, so our 
model could not have predicted them. Which means our model predicted 34 out of the top 80 
collegiate players according to ESPM. Our model also did better at the earlier and higher skill 
players as of the top 45 college players on the ESPN site our model predicted 29 of these players 
correctly, including 17 out of the top 25 players.  
The most notable misses are the following players Darius Garland, Jaxson Hayes, Nassir Little, 
Nickeil Alexander-Walker, KZ Okpala, Kevin Porter, and Talen Horton-Tucker.  
The below table is our projected ordering of how players will be drafted based on the probability 
that our model gave them for chances of being drafted. 
 
Pick Player Team Prob Pick Player Team Prob 
1 R.J. Barrett duke 99.41% 31 De'Andre Hunter virginia 38.64% 
2 Zion Williamson duke 98.83% 32 Rui Hachimura gonzaga 37.44% 
3 Ja Morant murray-state 98.18% 33 Kris Wilkes ucla 36.96% 
4 PJ Washington kentucky 97.11% 34 Matisse Thybulle washington 36.28% 
5 Bol Bol oregon 95.25% 35 Marcquise Reed clemson 31.19% 
6 Dedric Lawson kansas 90.80% 36 Udoka Azubuike kansas 31.01% 
7 Bruno Fernando maryland 82.49% 37 Eric Carter delaware 30.80% 
8 Tyler Herro kentucky 79.91% 38 Jalen McDaniels san-diego-state 30.19% 
9 Jarrett Culver texas-tech 78.92% 39 Justin Turner bowling-green-state 27.10% 
10 Grant Williams tennessee 75.22% 40 Mfiondu Kabengele florida-state 26.64% 
11 Jason Burnell jacksonville-state 72.21% 41 Bennie Boatwright southern-california 26.48% 
12 Cam Reddish duke 70.84% 42 Jaylen Nowell washington 24.69% 
13 Brandon Clarke gonzaga 69.62% 43 Ignas Brazdeikis michigan 24.21% 
14 Cassius Winston michigan-state 66.66% 44 Lagerald Vick kansas 23.96% 
15 Keldon Johnson kentucky 65.84% 45 EJ Montgomery kentucky 23.78% 
16 Markus Howard marquette 64.17% 46 Ashton Hagans kentucky 23.70% 
17 Cameron Johnson north-carolina 62.74% 47 Marial Shayok iowa-state 23.65% 
18 Ethan Happ wisconsin 62.71% 48 Naz Reid louisiana-state 23.32% 
19 Nathan Knight william-mary 58.66% 49 Coby White north-carolina 23.16% 
20 Matt Rafferty furman 52.90% 50 Nick Richards kentucky 22.78% 
21 Carsen Edwards purdue 50.24% 51 Nick Ward michigan-state 22.63% 
22 Reid Travis kentucky 49.72% 52 Admiral Schofield tennessee 22.39% 
23 Shamorie Ponds st-johns-ny 47.81% 53 Ky Bowman boston-college 22.37% 
24 Jordan Nwora louisville 47.58% 54 Luke Maye north-carolina 22.35% 
25 Jon Teske michigan 45.48% 55 Jarron Cumberland cincinnati 22.21% 
26 Ty Jerome virginia 44.34% 56 Kyle Guy virginia 21.37% 
27 Moses Brown ucla 44.08% 57 Oshae Brissett syracuse 20.83% 
28 Tremont Waters louisiana-state 44.07% 58 Lamine Diane cal-state-northridge 20.19% 
29 Jaylen Hands ucla 40.36% 59 Sam Hauser marquette 19.94% 
30 Juwan Morgan indiana 39.95% 60 Nick Rakocevic southern-california 17.86% 
Figure 35: 2019 NCAA players madeNBA probabilities 
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Similar to the above previous table this ordering is also not indicative of how we think the draft 
will actually be ordered. But we wanted to test how our model with the target being drafted 
would fair in predicting the current NCAA players. This model also had 26 players of the top 60 
players not be on the ESPN list. And just like the previous table the model fared better at higher 






7.1.1 Levels of Achievement 
 
In order to create our dataset, we had to establish certain criteria for determining if a player made 
the NBA. The other targets were far more black and white so we did not have to define them. 
Either they were a first round pick or they were not, lottery pick or not, etc. But for making the 
NBA we had to define what it meant to make the NBA. Our data was collected from Sports-
Reference.com which defined making the NBA as playing an NBA game. It is worth 
mentioning, however, that every false positive we had the player either returned to college and 
later made the target or was a later pick than the target (e.g. target was first round and they were 
a second round pick), played in the G League or Internationally, or returned to college and is 
playing this year. From this and the fact that we always had more false negatives than false 
positives we can infer that our model was too tight. But there is no simple way to resolve this 
issue as the graphs displaying the successes and misses showcase simply lowering the threshold 
value would not increase the precision and recall of our model. The resolution to this is far more 
complex and beyond the scope of this project. One potential solution could be creating a more 
accurate dataset with non-binary labels: for instance, 0 for not playing professionally, 1 for 
playing abroad, and 2 for playing in the NBA.  
 
A considerable amount also signed NBA contracts they just failed to make the cut when the 
regular season came around or never saw the court. It is debatable whether these such players 
who made an NBA roster should be considered having made the NBA. But due to the criteria 
established by our data source going back and manually editing the data would have been 
unreasonable. 
 
7.1.2 Returning to College 
 
A further challenge we had to address within our dataset was the players who returned to play 
college even when they would have made the NBA that year. Players who returned to play in 
college were unnecessary noise in our dataset and these players did show up as false positive in 
our predictions. A player like Willie Cauley-Stein in his 2012-13 season decided to go back and 
play another year at Kentucky. Our model predicted he had a 72% chance of making the NBA, 
far above the threshold of 50%. And although he later ended up playing in the NBA, his 2012-13 
is considered a miss and this adds more complexity to an already complex task.  
 
These players who return to college but were deemed ready for the NBA often are seen across 
our predictions as misses because they also were likely to be predicted to be drafted, in the first 
round or a lottery pick. For example, Cody Zeller was “missed” 3 times because our model 
predicted he would be drafted, be a first round and lottery pick in 2011-12 but since he returned 
to play another year at college all of these predictions were seen as false positives even though 
he eventually was a lottery pick. A case could be made that had he declared for the draft in 2011-
12 he would have been drafted highly. Overall there are more factors than just if a player would 
be drafted or play in the NBA as some players choose to stay. These reasons are impossible to 
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account for with the dataset we had access to and will always result in variability for these kinds 
of predictions. 
 
7.2 Needle in a Haystack 
 
When it comes to predicting how NCAA DI performance will translate into NBA related 
achievements one is truly trying to find a needle in a haystack. The vast majority of players will 
never come close to being drafted or playing an NBA game. A model that predicts no one would 
make the NBA would be correct 99% of the time. But such a model is useless as the only portion 
people care about is that 1%. Typically, Machine Learning models (especially simple ones) 
struggle with such a skewed classification problem. It is encouraging, however, that our models 
were extremely effective, despite their simplicity.  
  
7.3 Coefficients 
Below are the three tables with the strong coefficients located above.  
 
All NCAA / Was drafted 
 
Metric Weight Metric Weight 
Minutes Played -1.034 Height 1.123 
Games Active -0.8395 Win Shares 0.8628 
Free Throws Made -0.5135 Turnovers 0.5359 
2-pointers Made -0.5004 Assists 0.4644 
Assist Percentage -0.4954 Usage Rate 0.4493 
Year (1 = FR, 4 = SR) -0.3910 2-point attempts 0.4407 
True Shooting % -0.3733 Field Goal Attempts 0.4378 
Personal Fouls -0.3644 Blocks per minute 0.3601 
Player Efficiency Rating -0.2657 Points Produced 0.3110 
Games Started -0.2333 Offensive Box +/- 0.3055 
 
At a first glance the positive factors make sense, since the NBA is such a large jump from 
NCAA DI a player’s height is a crucial factor in determining if they could even make the NBA. 
However, the large factor placed on height may be the reason that a lot of our misses occur. Our 
models tended to produce false positives on front court players and false negatives on back court 
players. But this is all part of the imperfection of trying to predict NBA readiness from collegiate 
data. Some players skill will overcome their physical limitations while some players physical 
stature is not enough to overcome their lack of skill or seen potential.  
 
Similarly, Minutes Played seems like a strange negative indicator for success. Intuitively we 
would expect a player to be more successful if they played more minutes, but apparently the 























Interestingly, the strongest positive indicator only has a weight of 0.6605, compared to the 
previous experiment which weighted Height at 1.123. Free Throws Made and Attempts are both 
the second strongest predictors, but on opposite sides of the spectrum. Our belief is that the 
model is simply correcting itself to negate the impact of the features overall. 
 
It also jumps out that the colleges begin to play a stronger role in predictions for freshmen only. 
The prestige of some of the top basketball schools in the country comes through, with Kentucky, 
Duke and Kansas all making the top 10 positive predictors.  
 
Last Seasons / First Round Pick  
 
Metric Weight Metric Weight 
Minutes Played -0.5499 Offensive Win Shares 0.6620 
Block Percentage -0.5127 Win Shares 0.6372 
3-pointers Made -0.3811 Turnovers 0.5496 
high-point -0.3048 Blocks 0.4379 
Games Active -0.2956 Defensive Win Shares 0.3983 
Free Throw % -0.2919 Points Produced 0.3709 
north-carolina-central -0.2687 Offensive Rebounds 0.3552 
Defensive Rebounds -0.2686 Steals 0.3499 
Metric Weight Metric Weight 
Minutes Played -1.152 Turnovers 0.6605 
Free Throws Made -0.3357 Free Throw Attempts 0.4857 
Total Rebounds -0.2379 Win Shares 0.4516 
Assists -0.2200 Height 0.4005 
incarnate-word -0.1936 kentucky 0.2968 
Field Goal % -0.1901 Player Efficiency Rating 0.2955 
mississippi -0.1836 Offensive Win Shares 0.2905 
new-mexico-state  -0.1821 duke   0.2824 
north-texas  -0.1783 kansas  0.2775 
morgan-state  -0.1708 Blocks 0.2722 
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albany-ny -0.2644 Free Throw Attempts 0.3425 
middle-tennessee -0.2569 Height 0.3243 
 
For the last seasons dataset, Win Shares is massively important, with the two components of the 
metric (Offensive WS and Defensive WS) showing up in the strongest positive predictors. Also 
interesting to note, is that the top basketball schools fall out of the top 10 rankings. Most NBA-
quality players from these schools leave after one year, whereas smaller school players typically 
play all four years, lending credence to this model in particular.   
 
Overall, machine learning models tend to be black-box like. It can be hard to extract meaning 
from the individual coefficients, even in a simple model like a logistic regression. What is 
undisputable, however, is that the models overall do an excellent job of predicting NBA success, 
especially considering the incredibly skewed nature of the dataset. There are certainly many 
more predicting variables that enter the decision-making process for an actual NBA team when 
choosing players, such as the player’s mentality, health concerns, and performance in private 
workouts held just before the draft. While some of these factors are unquantifiable, there are 






8. Future Work 
The major challenges were presented by the access we had to data sources for all phases of the 
project. In the predictive component, we faced difficulties with obtaining enough years of data to 
extract meaningful results, dealing with inaccuracies in the way year of college was modeled, 
and missing values for physical measurements. Additionally, the need to manually check for 
players who returned to school or played internationally presented further problems. 
Ideally, the dataset would also include international players, and weight their league accordingly. 
Especially as NBA superstars increasingly hail from outside the US, more importance is being 
placed on the quality and accuracy of international scouting. With our model able to consistently 
extract which schools generate more NBA talent, we feel that it would provide similar results if 
adding European teams into the mix.  
One actionable solution to this problem that NBA teams probably have access to is a list of 
players whom have declared for the NBA Draft for a given year. That way, the model would not 
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Appendix A: Experiment Results 
This appendix contains the remaining results of the experiments we conducted.  
 
Predicting whether an NCAA DI player will play an NBA game 
Our model had a total of 53 Misses where 13 were false positives and 40 were false negatives. 
The total size of the players was 5712. This means that for players that did not make the NBA we 
were correct 5630 out of the 5643 times and for players that did make the NBA we were correct 
19 out of the 59 times. Below are the corresponding precision, recall, f1-score and support 
metrics. 
 
The following table shows details about every miss our model had along with what certainty 
(prob make target) our model predicted this player to achieve the target. 
E.g. our model predicted that Grayson Allen had a 97% chance of making the NBA and so it 
predicted he would make the NBA. Since that year Allen returned to college it was considered a 
“not” miss type which is a false positive. On the other hand, our model predicted that Dion 
Waiters had a 44.65% chance of not making the NBA since that is below the threshold of 50% 
the model predicted he would not make the NBA, but he did end up making the NBA so it is 












Yellow = Returned to college and went on to play in the NBA 
Green = Returned to college and playing this collegiate season 
Blue = Returned to college and played in the G League after college 
Name Year Predicted Actual NBA Probability Miss Type 
Grayson Allen 2015-16 1 0 97.0% not 
Kyle Anderson 2012-13 1 0 88.6% not 
Miles Bridges 2016-17 1 0 81.6% not 
Willie Cauley-Stein 2012-13 1 0 72.4% not 
Jontay Porter 2017-18 1 0 71.6% not 
Tyrone Wallace 2014-15 1 0 66.4% not 
Jameel Warney 2014-15 1 0 66.1% not 
Bryce Alford 2014-15 1 0 64.1% not 
Juwan Morgan 2017-18 1 0 58.6% not 
Ivan Rabb 2015-16 1 0 55.5% not 
Kyle Wiltjer 2014-15 1 0 55.1% not 
Bryce Alford 2015-16 1 0 54.8% not 
Antonio Campbell 2015-16 1 0 51.4% not 
Caris LeVert 2015-16 0 1 48.1% made 
Joseph Young 2014-15 0 1 47.2% made 
Dion Waiters 2011-12 0 1 44.6% made 
Dakari Johnson 2014-15 0 1 42.7% made 
Branden Dawson 2014-15 0 1 38.9% made 
Tyler Cavanaugh 2016-17 0 1 36.1% made 
Matt Costello 2015-16 0 1 32.3% made 
Tyler Ennis 2013-14 0 1 30.8% made 
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Jerrelle Benimon 2013-14 0 1 18.5% made 
Zach Collins 2016-17 0 1 17.1% made 
Jarrett Allen 2016-17 0 1 16.0% made 
Sterling Brown 2016-17 0 1 15.6% made 
James Michael McAdoo 2013-14 0 1 15.6% made 
Shake Milton 2017-18 0 1 15.1% made 
Damyean Dotson 2016-17 0 1 15.0% made 
Khyri Thomas 2017-18 0 1 13.1% made 
Duncan Robinson 2017-18 0 1 10.9% made 
Zach LaVine 2013-14 0 1 10.8% made 
Travis Wear 2013-14 0 1 10.1% made 
K.J. McDaniels 2013-14 0 1 9.8% made 
Marquese Chriss 2015-16 0 1 9.7% made 
Troy Brown 2017-18 0 1 8.9% made 
Kay Felder 2015-16 0 1 8.8% made 
Jake Layman 2015-16 0 1 7.7% made 
Isaiah Whitehead 2015-16 0 1 6.2% made 
Johnathan Williams 2017-18 0 1 6.1% made 
Diamond Stone 2015-16 0 1 5.5% made 
Fred VanVleet 2015-16 0 1 5.2% made 
Marcus Paige 2015-16 0 1 3.7% made 
Alize Johnson 2017-18 0 1 3.1% made 
Marcus Derrickson 2017-18 0 1 2.4% made 
Shawn Long 2015-16 0 1 2.1% made 
Elfrid Payton 2013-14 0 1 1.6% made 
Ben Bentil 2015-16 0 1 1.0% made 
Kris Dunn 2015-16 0 1 0.9% made 
Wesley Iwundu 2016-17 0 1 0.8% made 
Alan Williams 2014-15 0 1 0.6% made 
Shayne Whittington 2013-14 0 1 0.5% made 
 
7 ended up playing in the NBA after dataset was collected, 4 are in the G League and the last 2 










Yellow – Returned and was a lottery pick player 
Green – First Round Pick 
Blue - Undrafted but played in the NBA 
Name Year Predicted Actual Probability Made Miss Type 
Grayson Allen 2015-16 1 0 81.7% not 
Delon Wright 2013-14 1 0 61.9% not 
Willie Cauley-Stein 2012-13 1 0 51.4% not 
Christian Wood 2014-15 1 0 51.1% not 
Stanley Johnson 2014-15 0 1 40.9% made 
T.J. Warren 2013-14 0 1 16.1% made 
Mikal Bridges 2017-18 0 1 3.4% made 
Bradley Beal 2011-12 0 1 1.1% made 
Donovan Mitchell 2016-17 0 1 0.3% made 
Shabazz Muhammad 2012-13 0 1 0.2% made 
Zach LaVine 2013-14 0 1 0.1% made 












Yellow – Returned / Was First Round Pick 
Green – Undrafted played NBA 
Blue – Undrafted played in G League 
 
Name Year Predicted Actual Probability Made Miss Type 
Cody Zeller 2011-12 1 0 90.5% not 
Davon Usher 2013-14 1 0 81.1% not 
Willie Cauley-Stein 2012-13 1 0 71.8% not 
Miles Bridges 2016-17 1 0 71.3% not 
Kris Dunn 2014-15 1 0 50.8% not 
Aaron Harrison 2013-14 1 0 50.4% not 
Dejounte Murray 2015-16 0 1 49.8% made 
Moritz Wagner 2017-18 0 1 47.3% made 
Devin Booker 2014-15 0 1 45.3% made 
Zach Collins 2016-17 0 1 23.6% made 
Jarrett Allen 2016-17 0 1 20.7% made 
Otto Porter 2012-13 0 1 17.8% made 
Caleb Swanigan 2016-17 0 1 14.6% made 
Myles Turner 2014-15 0 1 13.8% made 
OG Anunoby 2016-17 0 1 6.8% made 
Arnett Moultrie 2011-12 0 1 6.4% made 
Henry Ellenson 2015-16 0 1 6.2% made 
Skal Labissiere 2015-16 0 1 4.5% made 
Bradley Beal 2011-12 0 1 2.0% made 
Chandler Hutchison 2017-18 0 1 1.6% made 
Anthony Bennett 2012-13 0 1 1.5% made 
Sam Dekker 2014-15 0 1 1.3% made 
Jerome Robinson 2017-18 0 1 0.8% made 
DeAndre Bembry 2015-16 0 1 0.7% made 













Yellow – Returned to College was Drafted 
Green – Undrafted Played in NBA 
Blue – Returned to school, playing this year 
Name Year Predicted Actual Draft Probability Miss Type 
Aaron Harrison 2013-14 1 0 82.9% not 
Luke Kennard 2015-16 1 0 63.4% not 
Trevon Duval 2017-18 1 0 52.1% not 
Jarrett Culver 2017-18 1 0 51.9% not 
Malik Beasley 2015-16 0 1 26.1% made 
Chris McCullough 2014-15 0 1 22.7% made 
Jarrett Allen 2016-17 0 1 19.5% made 
Zach LaVine 2013-14 0 1 7.5% made 
Justin Jackson 2016-17 0 1 5.6% made 
Arnett Moultrie 2011-12 0 1 2.3% made 
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Royce White 2011-12 0 1 2.2% made 
Troy Brown 2017-18 0 1 0.3% made 
Deyonta Davis 2015-16 0 1 0.2% made 
Lonnie Walker 2017-18 0 1 0.2% made 
 




Yellow- Returned to college was Lottery Pick 
Green – First Round Pick 
Purple – Second Round Pick 
Blue – Undrafted 
 
Name Year Predicted Actual Lottery Probability Type 
Cody Zeller 2011-12 1 0 98.1% not 
Jordan Adams 2012-13 1 0 86.6% not 
Aaron Harrison 2013-14 1 0 67.3% not 
Willie Cauley-Stein 2012-13 1 0 57.4% not 
Thomas Bryant 2015-16 1 0 56.2% not 
Lauri Markkanen 2016-17 0 1 38.4% made 
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Aaron Gordon 2013-14 0 1 27.2% made 
Ben Simmons 2015-16 0 1 2.0% made 
 





Yellow – Returned to College was First Round 
Green - Undrafted 
Name Year Predicted Actual 1st Round Prob. Miss 
Type 
Cody Zeller 2011-12 1 0 94.6% not 
Aaron Harrison 2013-14 1 0 78.5% not 
Austin Rivers 2011-12 0 1 26.1% made 
Omari Spellman 2017-18 0 1 7.6% made 
Zach Collins 2016-17 0 1 5.0% made 
Collin Sexton 2017-18 0 1 3.2% made 
Harry Giles 2016-17 0 1 1.4% made 
Jaylen Brown 2015-16 0 1 0.4% made 














Yellow – Returned to college made NBA 
Green – G League/ International 
Blue – Returned to college, playing this year 
Purple - Injury 
Name Year Predicted Actual NBA Probability Miss Type 
Brandon McCoy 2017-18 1 0 97.1% not 
Ethan Happ 2017-18 1 0 94.5% not 
Tyus Battle 2017-18 1 0 92.4% not 
Luke Kornet 2016-17 1 0 92.0% not 
Johnathan Motley 2016-17 1 0 88.8% not 
Josh Scott 2015-16 1 0 88.4% not 
Kennedy Meeks 2016-17 1 0 85.6% not 
Kris Wilkes 2017-18 1 0 85.0% not 
Isaiah Austin 2013-14 1 0 84.5% not 
Will Clyburn 2012-13 1 0 84.3% not 
Michael Young 2016-17 1 0 82.0% not 
Perry Ellis 2015-16 1 0 80.8% not 
Eric Mika 2016-17 1 0 80.2% not 
Luke Maye 2017-18 1 0 77.8% not 
Justin Jackson 2013-14 1 0 68.4% not 
Jalen Jones 2015-16 1 0 68.4% not 
Trevon Bluiett 2017-18 1 0 65.1% not 
Ryan Anderson 2015-16 1 0 61.7% not 
Chris Jones 2011-12 1 0 58.3% not 
Jalen Jones 2014-15 1 0 57.7% not 
Brandon Ashley 2014-15 1 0 57.7% not 
Shamorie Ponds 2017-18 1 0 51.4% not 
Cameron Lard 2017-18 1 0 50.8% not 
Troy Williams 2015-16 0 1 48.6% made 
Zach LaVine 2013-14 0 1 47.2% made 
Ike Anigbogu 2016-17 0 1 44.9% made 
Ryan Arcidiacono 2015-16 0 1 44.4% made 
Terry Rozier 2014-15 0 1 39.5% made 
Montrezl Harrell 2014-15 0 1 37.7% made 
Andre Dawkins 2013-14 0 1 31.7% made 
OG Anunoby 2016-17 0 1 31.1% made 
Bryce Dejean-Jones 2014-15 0 1 27.0% made 
Buddy Hield 2015-16 0 1 26.9% made 
Domantas Sabonis 2015-16 0 1 23.9% made 
Raymond Spalding 2017-18 0 1 17.7% made 
Dorian Finney-Smith 2015-16 0 1 16.9% made 
Arnett Moultrie 2011-12 0 1 16.9% made 
Melvin Frazier 2017-18 0 1 11.1% made 
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Maurice Ndour 2014-15 0 1 10.7% made 
Marquese Chriss 2015-16 0 1 10.6% made 
Landry Shamet 2017-18 0 1 10.5% made 
Zach Collins 2016-17 0 1 10.4% made 
Pat Connaughton 2014-15 0 1 10.2% made 
Jabari Bird 2016-17 0 1 9.5% made 
John Collins 2016-17 0 1 7.6% made 
Fred VanVleet 2015-16 0 1 6.9% made 
Alize Johnson 2017-18 0 1 6.0% made 
Jarnell Stokes 2013-14 0 1 5.6% made 
DeAndre Bembry 2015-16 0 1 5.4% made 
Malcolm Miller 2014-15 0 1 3.9% made 
Justin Patton 2016-17 0 1 3.3% made 
Larry Nance 2014-15 0 1 2.7% made 
Khyri Thomas 2017-18 0 1 1.3% made 
Johnathan Williams 2017-18 0 1 0.5% made 
Xavier Munford 2013-14 0 1 0.2% made 
 







Yellow – Returned to college later drafted 
Green – Undrafted played in NBA 
Blue – Undrafted played in G League/ Internationally 
Purple – Returned to college playing this year or injured 
Name Year Predicted Actual Draft Probability Miss Type 
Kenny Kadji 2012-13 1 0 80.0% not 
Bonzie Colson 2017-18 1 0 79.4% not 
Nathan Knight 2017-18 1 0 78.5% not 
P.J. Hairston 2012-13 1 0 74.9% not 
Derrick Walton 2016-17 1 0 71.5% not 
Isaiah Austin 2013-14 1 0 69.3% not 
Daniel Ochefu 2015-16 1 0 66.1% not 
Kyle Wiltjer 2015-16 1 0 59.3% not 
Justin Pierce 2017-18 1 0 55.7% not 
Shawn Long 2015-16 1 0 54.9% not 
Gary Clark 2017-18 1 0 52.1% not 
Justin Simon 2017-18 1 0 51.9% not 
Zach Auguste 2015-16 1 0 50.0% not 
Marcus Smart 2013-14 0 1 45.7% made 
Monte Morris 2016-17 0 1 33.9% made 
Malik Beasley 2015-16 0 1 29.5% made 
Khyri Thomas 2017-18 0 1 25.8% made 
Jerami Grant 2013-14 0 1 25.0% made 
Lonnie Walker 2017-18 0 1 20.8% made 
Keita Bates-Diop 2017-18 0 1 20.6% made 
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Grant Jerrett 2012-13 0 1 15.1% made 
Tony Bradley 2016-17 0 1 14.9% made 
Tony Carr 2017-18 0 1 11.8% made 
Josh Okogie 2017-18 0 1 11.4% made 
Melvin Frazier 2017-18 0 1 11.0% made 
Chandler Hutchison 2017-18 0 1 11.0% made 
Landry Shamet 2017-18 0 1 7.7% made 
Harry Giles 2016-17 0 1 7.0% made 
Sam Dekker 2014-15 0 1 5.4% made 
Jawun Evans 2016-17 0 1 3.8% made 
Jerome Robinson 2017-18 0 1 2.6% made 
Chimezie Metu 2017-18 0 1 2.4% made 
Jaron Blossomgame 2016-17 0 1 2.1% made 
Robert Williams 2017-18 0 1 1.6% made 
Olivier Hanlan 2014-15 0 1 1.5% made 
Colton Iverson 2012-13 0 1 1.4% made 
 






Yellow – Returned was later Lottery Pick 
Green – First Round pick 
Blue – Second Round Pick 
Purple - Returned to college, playing this year 
 
Name Year Predicted Actual Lottery Probability Type 
Delon Wright 2014-15 1 0 90.3% not 
L.J. Thorpe 2017-18 1 0 77.2% not 
Jordan Adams 2013-14 1 0 62.8% not 
Ivan Rabb 2016-17 1 0 56.3% not 
Mohamed Bamba 2017-18 0 1 26.2% made 
Myles Turner 2014-15 0 1 16.8% made 
Mikal Bridges 2017-18 0 1 3.8% made 
Elfrid Payton 2013-14 0 1 3.3% made 
Anthony Bennett 2012-13 0 1 2.4% made 
Andre Drummond 2011-12 0 1 1.3% made 
Alex Len 2012-13 0 1 0.7% made 
 
 
